There is a lack of consensus in the literature regarding the performance of structural models even though they have been used as a standard in credit risk modelling for the last thirty years. This paper tests the performance of three structural models, Merton (1974) , Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) stationary leverage ratio model and CreditGrades™ (2002) against the credit default swap spread using much larger dataset of 320 corporates over a longer time period than the existing literature.
Introduction
Corporate bonds are priced by charging a premium over the corresponding government bond yield (risk-free-yield). This premium is determined by the creditworthiness of the corporate borrower. Commonly called "credit spread," this gap represents the extent to which the company is at risk of defaulting on the bond, and compensates investors for bearing the risk.
The first structural model of Merton (1974) for pricing corporate bonds assumes that a firm defaults if the value of its assets is below its outstanding debt at the time of servicing the debt. Although this model has been widely adopted for valuing corporate bonds, the underlying assumptions of the original model often do not reflect economic reality.
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Several new structural models have refined the original framework of Merton (1974) by relaxing one or more unrealistic assumptions. For instance, Black and Cox (1976) introduced the first passage model whereby default could occur before maturity. Geske (1979) considered the risky coupon bond as a compound option and defined the default barrier as the market value of remaining debts. Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) modelled stochastic interest rates following a mean reverting process, where coupon bonds were considered a weighted sum of zero coupon bonds. Leland (1994) , and Leland and Toft (1996) assume that firms could issue equity to service debt and that default occurred when the value of equity goes to zero. Finally, Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) drop the assumption of a constant default boundary, and model leverage as a stationary process.
However, in spite of the growing number of structural models, there has been very limited empirical testing in the literature. Jones, Mason and Rosenfeld (1984) is among the first studies to test the predictive ability of the Merton (1974) model. Using data on 27 US firms with simple capital structures between 1975 and 1981, they find that the observed bond prices are much higher than those predicted by the model. Ogden (1987) reaches same conclusion using a sample of 57 new bond issues by US industrial corporations between 1973 and 1985 . Lyden and Saraniti (2001 study a sample of 56 US corporates with a single outstanding bullet bond between 1988 and 1999. They also conclude that both, Merton (1974) as well as Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) models underpredict the observed bond spreads.
However, Eom, Helwege and Huang (2004) find contrary evidence by implementing five structural models on a sample of 182 bonds between 1986 and 1997. 2 They find that while Merton (1974) and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) models do on average, predict spreads that are too low, the other three models produce estimates that are higher than those observed. However, they find that the absolute prediction errors of all the models are quite high, indicating poor predictive ability. Similarly, Delianedes and Geske (2001) look at the credit spreads of 470 bonds between 1991 and 1998, and find that Merton (1974) model estimates are able to explain only about 5% of the observed spread for AAA rated bonds and 22% for those rated BBB. They argue that bond spreads are mainly explained by market returns, market volatility, and bond liquidity.
Ericsson, Reneby and Wang (2007) is the first study that uses credit default swaps in addition to bonds to test the empirical performance of structural models. Using a sample of 23 industrial bonds between 1997 and 2003, and the same five structural models as in Eom et al. (2004) , they find no evidence of underprediction of CDS spreads. They also find that the results using bond spreads are sensitive to how the credit spread is measured.
Using the spread over treasury, they find, consistent with existing literature, underprediction of bond spreads, however, there is no such evidence if the spreads are measured over the swap curve. Further, using CDS spreads, they find no evidence of role of liquidity or credit ratings in the residuals.
In this paper we test the performance of three structural models in pricing credit default swaps. We select a generalization of Merton's model (1974) , since it is the seminal credit spread model. Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein's (2001) stationary leverage ratio model is chosen given its apparent superior performance according to the literature (e.g. Eom at al., 2004; Zhou, 2008), and Creditgrades (2002) as it is the current standard model used by a wide range of credit market practitioners.
We extend the existing literature in two ways. First, we provide a much cleaner test of the predictive ability of structural models by using CDS spreads rather than bond spreads used in the existing literature (with the exception of Ericsson et al., 2007) . CDS spreads arguably provide a cleaner proxy for default risk because they are more liquid than corporate bonds and are not influenced by parameters such as call provisions or coupons.
Secondly, our longer time period of 7 years that includes the current credit crisis period, and larger sample size of 320 corporates allows much stronger inferences. While we find underpricing of credit spreads as in existing literature, we also provide evidence for the first time that this is driven by CDS spreads reflecting liquidity premium as well as residual credit risk information from credit ratings. Once these factors are taken into consideration, we show that actual CDS spreads are actually lower than the implied spreads. We also show our findings are not influenced by the current credit crisis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theory behind the Merton, Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein, and Creditgrades models; section 3 focuses on the models' implementation, explains the data and methodology used; section 4 discusses the empirical results; and section 5 concludes.
Theory and model description
We test three market-based structural models, specifically Merton (M), Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (CDG), and CreditGrades (CG).
Generalization of Merton (1974) 3
The Merton (1974) model assumes that a firm with an initial value of V 0 issues a zerocoupon bond with a face value of D and a maturity of T. The critical assumptions behind the model are that markets are perfect, that trading in assets takes place continuously, and that the firm's value follows a geometric Brownian motion under a risk-neutral measure: 
Where: 
Collin-Dufresne Goldstein (2001)
This is a stationary leverage ratio model which assumes that firms tend to adopt a longterm stationary leverage ratio, i.e., they tend to issue debt when their leverage ratio falls below some target, and are more hesitant to replace maturing debt when their leverage is above that target. The model incorporates the idea that firms may adjust their outstanding debt levels in response to changes in firm value, which makes the stochastic leverage ratio revert to a mean value of Q l in a constant interest rate framework.
This approach follows the following firm-value dynamics:
The dynamics of other relevant variables under the risk-neutral measure are:
where: λ = the speed of adjustment to a company's target leverage, 4 and ν = the leverage reversion level. Equation (7) shows that k t is mean-reverting and its target level is given by   
Where is defined as the random time at which l(t) reaches zero for the first time, triggering default.
Assuming that a risky discount bond pays a fraction of 1 of the T-maturity risk-free bond at the time of default, its price can be written as:
is the risk-neutral probability that default occurs before time T, given that the leverage ratio is 0 l at time 0. Discretizing time into n equal intervals, and defining date  
4 Which in this model is a mean reverting coefficient
The term Q(l 0 ,T) is the limit of Q(l 0 , T, n) as
.The q i terms in equation (13) are defined recursively, which makes it straightforward to program this valuation expression and to calculate risky discount bond prices. Although Q(l 0 .T) is defined as the limit of Q(l 0 , T, n) according to Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) , the convergence is rapid; and numerical simulations show that setting n=200 results in values of Q(l 0 ,T) and Q(l 0 , T,n) that are virtually indistinguishable.
Creditgrades™
Creditgrades™ 5 (CG) belongs to the class of structural models derived from the Merton model. Similar to the Merton model, the CG model assumes that the firm's value evolves according to a geometrical Brownian process. Default is defined as the point at which the value of the firm is below the default barrier, i.e., when it will not be able to meet its financial obligations. The default barrier is defined as the amount of firm assets that remains should the firm default. The average recovery rate that the debt holders receive upon default is L*D, where L is the average recovery of the debt and D is the firm's debtper-share. The global recovery rate is assumed to follow a lognormal distribution with an L mean and the standard deviation of λ. The standard deviation of the global recovery rate is a way of modelling the uncertainties that affect the proper default barrier level. This is one of the prominent improvements claimed by the CreditGrades™ model over the Merton model. 5 For details about the model, see Finkelstein et al. (2002) The formula to determine a firm's survival probability up to time t is
The spread of the CDS with maturity T, * can be calculated as
Where and the function G is given by
With
Where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, is the standard deviation of the firm's value.
The yield to maturity of a zero coupon bond can be obtained using However, the impact of a complex capital structure requires a more careful analysis when it comes to determining each firm's recovery value. The accounting data is lagged by three months to avoid the look-ahead bias. Table 1 shows the inputs that are common to all three models, and those that are specific to each. Table 1 here
Model implementation

Parameters common to the three models:
 Maturity (T): We have used 5-year maturity CDSs, as they are most liquid.
 Risk Free Rate (RFR): US five-year zero rate.
 Volatility ( ): The asset volatility is estimated as in Bharath and Shumway (2008), i.e.:
Each month from March 2003 to Setptember 2010, the equity volatility is estimated for each sample firm using daily stock returns over the past year (250 trading days) and then annualised.
Debt volatility is estimated as in Bharath and Shumway (2008):
 Leverage: Leverage is defined as the ratio of the book value of debt to the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity.
 Recovery value (= 1 -loss given default) : Debt recovery rate is defined as the payment to a class of debtholders, measured as a fraction of the face value of claims held by that debt class. Debt recovery can vary widely depending on existing creditor classes. Absolute priority requires that more junior creditors receive financial consideration in a distress restructuring only when more senior creditors are paid in full. As in Eom, Helwege and Huang (2004) , we use a recovery value of 50% of face value, which is consistent with the average defaulted debt estimated by Moodys for US entities between 1920-1999 in Keenan, Shtogrin and Sobehart (1999) .
Model Specific parameters:
 Dividend yield (Merton and CDG) is defined as the annual dividend per share divided by the price per share. The dividend yield of the stock price is from the Datastream database.
 Speed of adjustment and target leverage, (CDG): The firm will adjust the outstanding book value in order to meet with a certain rate of . The speed of adjustment measures the extent to which a firm has narrowed the debt gap between last period's leverage and this period's target leverage. We use the sector average as the target mean reverting leverage. 
Measures of performance
We test the performance of the models using prediction error (for bias) and mean absolute prediction error (for accuracy) against observed credit spreads.
The monthly percentage prediction error for each firm in the sample is estimated as
The mean %PE is then estimated for each sample firm as:
Similarly, the monthly percentage absolute prediction error (%APE) and mean %APE are estimated as:
7 The mean reverting leverage is calculated as the Datastream sector average using data over the period 1970-2010. The average leverage is defined as
Where:
IS i,t = Model implied credit spread for firm i at the end of month t.
OS i,t = Observed credit spread for firm i at the end of month t.
In order to formally test whether (1) model predicted spreads can explain cross-sectional variation in observed spreads, and (2) whether the model spreads under or over predict the actual spreads, we run the following Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions each month:
CDS i,t = actual CDS spread for firm i at the end of month t, and IS i,t = Model implied credit spread for firm i at the end of month t.
If the model predicted spreads are able to explain the cross-sectional variation in observed spreads, we expect β IS to be positive and statistically significant. If the model spreads are on average lower than observed spreads, we expect α to be positive, while a negative α is expected if the models over estimate the spreads.
While the implied spreads are pure measures of credit risk, the actual spreads are likely to reflect other firm specific information as well. We test this by introducing CDS liquidity and credit ratings in the pricing equation and run the following Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions:
RATG i,t = Standard and Poor's credit rating for firm i at the end of month t, and LIQ i,t = Liquidity of the CDS of firm i at the end of month t measured as the difference between the bid and offer spread divided by the mid quote.
Other variables are as previously defined.
Following Ogden (1987) we convert credit ratings to a numerical scale from 1 (for rating AAA) to 7 (for rating CCC). We uses Moody's and Fitch's ratings (in this order) if S&P ratings are not available.
If liquidity and credit ratings do not carry any information about CDS spreads in addition to that in the model predicted spreads, we expect β LIQ and β RATG to be zero.
Finally, we test whether the outputs of more complex CDG and CG models carry any incremental information to that already in the simpler Merton model. We therefore introduce the predicted spreads from all three models in equations (26) and (27) simultaneously. However, the model is likely to suffer from multicollinearity due to high correlations between the spreads produced by the three models. To circumvent this problem, we use the orthogonalization procedure of Fama and French (1993) . Specifically, each month, we first estimate the following regression:
We then create the variable CG(0) as:
Each month, we also estimate the following regression:
And then create the variable CDG(0) as
The procedure gives CG(0) as a variable that carries information orthogonal to that in Merton, and CDG(0) as a variable that carries information orthogonal to both, Merton and CG. Table 2 presents the performance analysis based on the mean prediction and absolute prediction errors. The % mean prediction errors in column 2 are positive (13.8%, 62.2%, and 36.0% for M, CDG, and CG respectively) and statistically highly significant (t=3.0, 21.2 and 7.6 respectively). Column 3 shows that the median prediction errors are also positive and statistically highly significant for all three models. The evidence is consistent with existing literature in suggesting the structural models underestimate the observed spreads, though the Merton model estimates are the least biased of the three.
Results
Bias and predictive accuracy
Column 4 presents the % mean absolute errors and shows that the Merton model estimates are less accurate than those of other two models (114.2% for M as compared to 95.1% and 106.6% for CDG and CG respectively).
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The large magnitude of absolute prediction errors shows that the three structural models produce downward biased estimates that can be quite inaccurate. 
Test of predictive ability through cross-section regressions
In order to test the ability of the structural models in explaining the cross-sectional variation in observed spreads, we run the regressions in equations (31) and (32) Table 3 here Delianedis and Geske (2001) and Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005) find that the default risk explains a much larger proportion of observed credit spreads for firms with lower credit ratings. Since we have a small number of observations in some ratings categories, we aggregate the ratings in to three categories, A or better, BBB, and BB or worse.
11 Table 4 panel A shows that while the three structural models tested here significantly underpredict the credit spreads in all rating categories, consistent with existing literature, the prediction errors are smaller for lower rating. Further, panel B
shows that the absolute prediction errors are also lower for lower rating demonstrating increased prediction accuracy for such firms.
Table 4 here
The evidence presented so far demonstrates that actual credit spreads are, on average, higher than those predicted by the structural models. One potential explanation for this discrepancy is that while the implied spreads are pure measures of credit risk, the actual spreads may be influenced by other factors such as liquidity. Table 5 shows that the actual spreads contain both, additional credit risk information not captured by structural models as well as liquidity related information. While the structural model implied spreads are statistically highly significant in all four models in table 5, the coefficients on both, credit ratings (lowest t value = 9.5) as well as liquidity (lowest t value = 15.7) are positive and highly significant. The explanatory power of the models with 10 Untabulated results show that both CG and CDG carry incremental information using implied volatility or 10 year CDS. The intercepts however, are always positive and highly significant. 11 We have 2 observations with AAA, 14 with AA, and 6 with CCC rating.
credit rating and liquidity variables in addition to the structural model output jumps to a remarkable 76% or more. Interestingly, the intercepts are now negative and statistically highly significant in all four models (lowest t-statistic is 9.9), demonstrating that the apparent underprediction of actual spreads observed in the existing literature as well as table 3 above, is actually due to structural models missing some credit risk relevant information as well as the influence of liquidity. In fact, when liquidity and credit ratings are taken in account, the observed spreads are lower than those implied by the structural models. 
Robustness checks
Sub-period analysis
The credit crisis beginning with the collapse of Bear Sterns in March 2008 has had profound impact on the global credit markets. In this sub-section, we repeat our analyses separately for the period before and after the crisis. Results not tabulated here to save space show that before considering the impact of liquidity and credit ratings (as in table 3), the structural model spreads are lower than observed spreads in both periods. Including credit ratings and CDS liquidity measures in the regressions (as in table 5) shows, as expected, a much higher impact of liquidity on observed spreads in the post Bear Sterns period. Further, while the observed CDS spreads are, as for the full period, lower than implied spreads for both sub-periods once other firm specific variables are controlled for, the intercepts in the second sub-period are much larger in absolute terms than in the first period suggesting an even greater difference between observed and implied spreads in this period.
Alternative specifications of asset volatility
Asset volatility is a key driver of the spreads generated by the structural models. However, it is unobservable and there is no consensus in the literature on how it should be estimated.
The Creditgrades Zhong (2011) however claim that using option implied volatility yields better structural model estimates. We therefore repeat all our analysis with 90 days, 150 days, and 1000 days historical volatility as well as option implied volatility using average of the first available at-the-money put and call options with over 1 month maturity. All our conclusions remain unchanged with alternative specifications and are not tabulated here to save space. Our results with 10-year CDSs are also qualitatively the same. 
Industry analysis
Conclusions
This paper tests the performance of three structural models using a sample of 320 U.S. the existing literature, we use CDS spreads rather than bond spreads in our empirical tests because the former provide a much cleaner proxy for default risk. In addition, we do not restrict our sample to firms with simple capital structure and this allows our sample size to be much larger than extant studies leading to more robust conclusions.
The results show that consistent with existing literature, all three structural models produce spreads that are much lower than the observed CDS spreads, and this persists in all rating categories and industry sectors. We also show that the three models produce large prediction errors in addition to the bias. However, the news for structural models is not all bad, we find evidence that structural models can explain approximately a third of the cross sectional variation in observed CDS spreads. We also find that the three models tested here carry information incremental to each other, as well as to credit ratings and liquidity. However, contrary to the evidence of Ericsson et al. (2007) , we find that credit ratings and liquidity, both have a very strong influence on cross section of CDS spreads.
Together with the structural models, they can capture up to 80% of the variation.
Interestingly, we find that once we account for liquidity and credit ratings, the underprediction of credit spreads is replaced by overprediction, i.e., the observed credit spreads are lower than implied spreads once other firm specific factors are controlled for.
Since liquidity increases the explanatory power of implied spreads, we conclude that the observed credit spreads are not driven solely by firm default risk. Whether liquidity risk should be modelled depends on whether the ultimate goal of a structural model is to match observed spreads, or to price the firm's fundamental risk of default and convert it into a credit spread. However, the inability of our structural models to capture all the information in credit ratings indicates these models do not capture even the default risk related information completely.
Whether the difference between implied and observed credit spreads is due to other factors not-related to default risk or due to market inefficiency is a question we leave for future research. (0) is generated by orthogonalising CDG spreads with respect to Merton and CG(0) . RATG is the credit rating of each reference obligation each month, and LIQ is the bid-offer spread for each CDS. The Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
